HMAS Hobart in Vietnam

by Harry Daish

Part 1 of 2

This tale started as a story for grandchild­ren eager to learn details of their grandfather’s service in a destroyer in Vietnam.

In late February 1967 I was a senior Lieutenant of 16 years service, having just returned from three years exchange service with the Royal Navy, where I qualified as a Direction Officer. This course trained me as an Air Intercept Officer and Operations Room specialist. On completion of the course I served for two years in the RN aircraft carriers HMS Centaur and Victorious, where my primary duty was the control of jet fighters.

Joins Hobart

After a brief leave period in Australia I joined HMAS Hobart, just in time to sail for Vietnam for a six-month deployment as Australia’s first naval unit to be committed to that conflict. My feelings towards my profession at that stage were lukewarm because very long periods of separation during sea duty had made family life difficult. This feeling was offset to a degree by the excitement of finally going to war, having missed out on Korea in the early 50s and the Suez War in 1956. This was, after all, what the interminable years of training in mock warfare were designed for. As for Vietnam and its history, I was totally ignorant.

HMAS Hobart II (DDG-39) was a Charles F Adams class guided missile destroyer that displaced 4526 tons (full load) on a 133 x 14 x 4.6 metres (437 x 47 x 15 feet) hull. Two steam turbines provided 70,000 shp, which drove the ship at 33 knots. Commissioned 18 December 1965, her complement varied from 310 to 333 and armament included one SAM launcher, two 127 mm (five-inch) guns, one Ikara ASW launcher and two triple ASW torpedo tubes.

Like most of the ships company I swallowed the Menzies spin that Vietnam was a domino and bastion against the encroaching “Red Tide of Communism”. As it fell, so would Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia and finally it would be our turn. At this stage public sentiment in Australia was decidedly pro-war, much more so than the divided manner in which the Australian people greeted Howard’s foray. In fact our reasons for entering both the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts most likely stemmed from the need to appease our American allies. That, and the delight that political leaders from all persuasions seem to get from committing their countries to war, as long as they don’t have to suffer the hardships and dangers involved. And let’s face it, John Howard in a slouch hat would not deter many enemies.

“Sea Dragon”

After briefings in Subic Bay in the Philippines, Hobart sailed to the Gulf of Tonkin to join a Destroyer Task Unit as part of the US Seventh Fleet. We were mainly assigned to “Sea Dragon” operations, attacking North Vietnamese targets north of the demilitarised zone (DMZ) on the17th parallel of latitude. Operations south of the DMZ were code-named “Market Time”. These provided gun-fire support to allied forces in their actions against the Vietcong (VC) primarily, but also some regular North Vietnamese Army units. The allies comprised US,  Australian, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units.

During our very first night on station we were given a very clear example of the “fog of war” and the trick that nervous and overactive imaginations can play on those new to war. During the night, the Task Unit’s (TU’s) radar operators detected small fast-moving contacts homing in on us. No doubt with the Tonkin Gulf incidents firmly in mind, the TU went to Action Stations and opened fire in unison. After some 300 rounds of five-inch ammunition were fired, we finally twigged that our “dangerous” targets were really flocks of birds. The prevailing radar conditions were abnormal with a low atmospheric layer trapping their transmissions, creating highly spurious contacts. Since then, I’ve always thought that a similar condition occurred with the destroyers USS Maddox and Turner Joy, triggering the second Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964. Everything that I have read subsequently on the subject seems to bear this out. (“From little acorns do large oaks grow.”)

Busy deployment

Under the command of CAPT Guy Griffiths DSC (later RADM, AO DSO DSC) our first six-month deployment passed very rapidly. We operated mostly off North Vietnam and came under fire from North Vietnamese coastal batteries as we closed the coast for gun firings on a number of occasions.

Ed note: Fairfax (1980, p. 45) says Hobart, the first warship to carry the new Australian white ensign into action, came under fire nine times, fired 9204 rounds on 1050 targets and steamed 52,529 miles in her first deployment.

The enemy fire never hit us, although on occasion their fall of shot was close enough to litter our decks with shrapnel. As my action station was Action Officer of the Watch on the bridge I had a grandstand view of proceedings. The drill on spotting enemy fire was to alert the Operations Room, order full speed ahead and put the wheel hard over to clear the scene as quickly as possible. Fortunately, the enemy’s fire control systems were fairly primitive and so the accuracy of their shot rapidly fell away.